

## **The Twofold Dimension of Human Constitutive Technicity**

The proponents of the paradigm of human constitutive technicity (Havelange, Lenay & Stewart 2003) argue that our nature is integrally structured through technical practices: humans are the products of the feedback of the technologies that they construct, utilize and transmit. This perspective, developed by contemporary philosophers such as Peter Sloterdijk (2001), Bernard Stiegler (2018) and Carlo Sini (2021), draws our attention to the subjectivizing effects of artefacts, i.e., how our biological, cognitive and behavioural constitution is determined by the sets of tools and devices circulating in a given sociohistorical context.

In this paper, I aim to elaborate on some transdisciplinary consequences of this paradigm, concerning its relationship with contemporary biology and evolutionary anthropology particularly. Palaeoanthropologists such as Richard Wrangham (2009), Kim Sterelny (2012) and Lambros Malafouris (2013), indeed, argue that our speciation process could only occur thanks to the artificial selection (Moore 2017) exerted on Hominins by the technological environments that they contributed to producing across the generations, rendering their cultural construction of ecological niches ‘exceptionally potent’ (Laland & Brown 2006: 96). At the same time, as scientific objects (Latour & Woolgar 1979; Haraway 1988), biological knowledge itself and its evolutionary paradigm are technically constructed, i.e., they are rendered possible and mediated by complexes of laboratory technologies—such as dating, indexing and classification techniques for the fossil records, for instance.

Human technical constitution is therefore twofold: on the one hand, our biology is constantly rearranged by our relationship with artefacts. On the other, our conception of what it means to be humans (as a biological species) is structured by the technologies that preside over scientific research and divulgation. I would therefore aim to show that a fundamental implication of the paradigm of human constitutive technicity is that, according to the technologies each time adopted within a collective, not only its members’ psychophysical constitution changes but also the way of conceiving of this constitution.

Thus, while human life as technical life is constantly constituted (and therefore also possibly destituted, i.e., rendered inhuman) by the technologies we adopt, through these technologies we may also frame an account of our place in the world, what Yuk Hui (2016) calls a cosmotechnics—evolutionary biology representing, within western modernity, one of the most influential and advanced of these narratives, as famously scrutinized by Jacques Derrida (2020), for instance. Through technologies, we structure our self-understanding (as well as its limits, insofar as scientific development, for instance, is highly reliant on the available technological means), while being

moulded by these technologies in turn. From this perspective, we can appreciate how technologies shape who we *are* as well as who we *think* we are, in a recursive dynamic of mutual conditioning.